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Introduction 
On June 23, the UK voted by a margin of 52% to 48% to leave the EU.1 Within hours of 
the result, significant questions, which hardly surfaced during the long campaign, about 
the process of withdrawal and the possible terms on which it might take place began to 
emerge. The majority of these are political; as developments within both the 
Conservative and Labour parties amply testify. But many are legal. Much attention has, 
quite rightly, focused on questions of UK constitutional law – with lively debate about 
the status of referendums, the relationship between Parliament and the royal 
prerogative, and the role of the Scottish Parliament and Northern Irish Assembly. EU 
law has also been discussed, with Article 50 TEU, the provision introduced in the Treaty 
of Lisbon enabling a Member State to withdraw from the EU, being the principal focus. 
In this short paper, I offer a tentative analysis of the EU law questions surrounding 
withdrawal from the EU; focusing on the interpretation and application of Article 50 
TEU. The text of Article 50 contains a number of ambiguities, and the answers to many 
of the legal questions which arise are shrouded in uncertainty. This uncertainty 
contributes towards the volatility of the current situation, damaging the European 
economy. I offer some thoughts on the mechanisms through which answers might 
emerge. Throughout, I suggest possible answers to the legal questions. These are 
informed by the current political context, and are designed to ensure that the 
withdrawal process produces an outcome which is legitimate from the perspectives of 
both the UK and the EU.2 
At the outset, it is worth emphasising two important points, which might otherwise be 
obscured.  
First, it is all too easy in this context, as I have above, to refer to ‘the UK’ and ‘the EU’. 
This leads to the belief that both are monolithic entities with set objectives, one ranged 
against the other as the withdrawal process begins. This is of course not the case. The 
referendum has made it clear that the UK is a divided nation. England and Wales voted 
to leave, while Scotland and Northern Ireland voted to remain. There are also painful 
divisions between urban and rural areas, and the young and the old. Leave campaigners 
were not forced to, and (at least insofar as their objective was to win the referendum, 
                                                          
* I would like to thank Albert Sanchez-Graells and the many other friends and colleagues with whom I 
have been discussing Article 50 since June 23. 
1 See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/politics/eu_referendum/results.  
2 In this paper I do not engage with the literature on legitimacy; though it would be interesting to develop 
a more overtly theoretical approach. The core concern is with the social and normative acceptability of 
the withdrawal process, in both the UK and the EU. 
sensibly) did not choose to articulate a clear vision of the future relationship between 
the UK and the EU. As a result, the referendum does not offer a clear mandate to the UK 
government, or to Parliament, which it might use to guide it in withdrawal negotiations. 
The EU is also divided. The EU institutions, and the governments of the Member States 
did not want ‘Brexit’, and cannot be expected to be united in their response. Many 
governments have trade interests which they want to protect. Others see economic 
opportunities in adopting a harder line against an always reluctant partner. All have an 
eye on the domestic political context. It is not immediately obvious what sort of deal 
with the UK best serves the ‘EU interest’.    
Second, the legal analysis presented here is, as stated above, tentative. This paper is 
written in the immediate aftermath of the UK’s vote to leave the EU. I have little doubt 
that various elements of the legal argumentation can (and hopefully will) be further 
developed. It is also inevitable that some of the analysis presented here will be 
overtaken by events, and that much may in the end depend on the resolution to 
questions not posed here. There is nevertheless, I hope, some utility in producing this 
analysis at this stage, with the explicit aim of informing the debate among the key actors 
involved in the Brexit negotiations in this key period before the positions of the 
European institutions and the governments of the Member States begin to crystallise.   
The Article 50 TEU process 
The Treaty of Lisbon, via Article 50 TEU, introduced a specific EU law mechanism 
through which States may withdraw from the European Union. One searches in vain for 
an analysis of the provision in the main EU law textbooks. The origins of the provision 
lie in the draft Article I-60 of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe.3 As such, 
Article 50 is ‘an integral part of the EU constitutional(izing) package, rather than an 
element of the de-constitutionalization course instigated by the 2007 
Intergovernmental Conference, following the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty’.4 It 
has not been used, or tested.5 In the context of the referendum in the UK, the Article was 
analysed in detail by the UK Government,6 and the House of Lords European 
                                                          
3 OJ C 169/1 [2003]. 
4 See C Hillion, ‘Accession and Withdrawal in the Law of the European Union’ in A Arnull and D Chalmers 
(eds), The Oxford Handbook of European Union Law (OUP, 2015) 126 at 149. See also A Lazowski, 
‘Withdrawal from the European Union and Alternatives to Membership’ (2012) 37 ELRev 523. Hillion 
references the scholarly scrutiny the provision has received at note 46. 
5 There is some discussion of Article 50 in Re Ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon [2010] 3 CMLR 13, 
before the German Constitutional Court at [305]-[306]; and in Re Ratification of the Lisbon Treaty [2010] 
1 CMLR 42, before the Latvian Supreme Court. It was also referred to in the High Court in the UK in 
Shindler [2016] EWHC 957 (Admin). 
6 HM Government, ‘The Process for Withdrawing from the European Union’, Cm 9216, February 2016, 
available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/503908/54538_EU_S
eries_No2_Accessible.pdf.   
Committee,7 and the European Parliament.8 In the days following the vote in favour of 
leaving the EU, the Houses of Parliament have produced further reports,9 and the 
withdrawal procedure has been the focus of much analysis and speculation.10  
As Hillion says, ‘a common critique in the literature is that the procedure of Article 50 is 
formulated in an ‘incomplete’, ‘unclear’, if not ‘cryptic’ fashion, thus generating 
‘uncertainty’’.11 As will become clear below, the text of the provision does not provide 
answers to many of the key legal questions. Were the interpretation of the Article to 
come before the Court of Justice, and there is some discussion below of the 
circumstances in which this may occur, it could therefore be expected to apply a flexible 
purposive approach.12 Hillion argues, and some may find this rather paradoxical, that 
Article 50 has a specific function in relation to the integration process in that it ‘bolsters 
the normative basis for a negotiated withdrawal’ and ‘points towards a strong post-
withdrawal engagement by the Union with the former Member State’.13 My analysis 
below builds on this approach, seeking to interpret the provision in the context of the 
current situation in a way which ensures that the UK is best able to maintain a working 
relationship with the EU, and achieves a settlement in which the interests of citizens of 
the EU are, as far as possible, protected. Any other approach, such as one, for example, 
                                                          
7 House of Lords European Committee, 11th Report of Session 2015-16, ‘The Process of Withdrawing 
from the European Union’, May 2016, available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201516/ldselect/ldeucom/138/138.pdf.   
8 European Parliament Briefing, ‘Article 50: Withdrawal of a Member State from the EU’, February 2016, 
available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/577971/EPRS_BRI(2016)577971_EN.pdf.   
9 House of Commons Briefing Paper Number 7551, ‘Brexit: How does the Article 50 process work?’, 30 
June 2016; House of Lords Library Note, ‘Leaving the EU: Parliament’s Role in the Process’, 30 June 2016. 
10 See for example: A Renwick, ‘The Road to Brexit: 16 Things You Need to Know about the Process of 
Leaving the EU’, The Constitution Unit, available at https://constitution-unit.com/2016/06/24/the-road-
to-brexit-16-things-you-need-to-know-about-the-process-of-leaving-the%E2%80%AFeu/#more-5134, N 
Barber, T Hickman and J King, ‘Pulling the Article 50 ‘trigger’: Parliament’s Indispensable Role’, UK 
Constitutional Law Association Blog, available at https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2016/06/27/nick-
barber-tom-hickman-and-jeff-king-pulling-the-article-50-trigger-parliaments-indispensable-role/, K 
Armstrong, ‘Push Me, Pull You, Whose Hand on the Article 50 trigger’, UK Constitutional Law Association 
Blog, available at: https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2016/06/27/kenneth-armstrong-push-me-pull-you-
whos-hand-on-the-article-50-trigger/, S Douglas-Scott, ‘Brexit, The Referendum and the UK Parliament: 
Some Questions about Sovereignty’, UK Constitutional Law Association Blog, available at 
https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2016/06/28/sionaidh-douglas-scott-brexit-the-referendum-and-the-
uk-parliament-some-questions-about-sovereignty/, E O’Dell, ‘Would it fly? A possible Article 50 route to a 
second referendum’, available at http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/article-50-route-to-a-second-
referendum/#Author, A Duff, ‘Everything you need to know about Article 50 (but were afraid to ask)’, 
available at http://verfassungsblog.de/brexit-article-50-duff/, A Georgopoulos, ‘’Brexit’, Article 50 and 
the Constitutional Significance of the UK Referendum’, available at http://www.ejiltalk.org/brexit-article-
50-teu-and-the-constitutional-significance-of-the-uk-referendum/, ‘S Peers, ‘Article 50: Can the UK force 
the pace of Brexit’, The Conversation, available at https://theconversation.com/article-50-can-the-eu-
force-the-pace-of-brexit-61626, P Syrpis, ‘Once the UK triggers Article 50 to start Brexit, can it turn 
back?’, The Conversation, available at https://theconversation.com/once-the-uk-triggers-article-50-to-
start-brexit-can-it-turn-back-61727. 
11 Hillion, n4 above at 135. 
12 See G Conway, The Limits of Legal Reasoning and the European Court of Justice (2014, CUP). 
13 Hillion, n4 above at 150-51. 
based on the safeguarding of the interests of the EU27 at the expense of the interests of 
the withdrawing State, should be rejected. 
Article 50 provides that a Member State ‘may decide to withdraw from the Union in 
accordance with its own constitutional requirements’. It ‘shall notify the European 
Council of its intention’. A process of negotiation ensues, ‘in the light of the guidelines 
provided by the European Council’. Paragraph 3 makes it clear that the Treaties ‘shall 
cease to apply to the state in question from the date of entry into force of the 
withdrawal agreement, or failing that, two years after the notification’, ‘unless the 
European Council, in agreement with the State concerned, unanimously decides to 
extend this period’. Thus, the withdrawing state remains a full member of the EU until 
the process has run its course, though paragraph 4 does provide that ‘for the purposes 
of paragraph 2 and 3, the member of the European Council or of the Council 
representing the withdrawing Member State shall not participate in the discussions of 
the European Council or Council or in decisions concerning it’. Finally, paragraph 5 
states that ‘if a State which has withdrawn from the Union asks to rejoin, its request 
shall be subject to the procedure referred to in Article 49’; that is the normal accession 
procedure.  
The operation of Article 50 raises a number of difficult legal questions. In the sections 
below, this paper considers a) whether it is possible to withdraw from the EU without 
using the Article 50 process; b) who makes the decision to trigger Article 50; c) whether 
there should be informal negotiations prior to the triggering of Article 50; d) whether it 
is possible to rescind an Article 50 notification, or otherwise stop the withdrawal 
process; e) the scope of the withdrawal negotiations; f) the extension of the two-year 
time period; g) the status and likely influence of the UK during the negotiation process; 
and h) the conclusion of the withdrawal agreement. It then considers the ways in which 
any disagreements as to the operation of Article 50 may be resolved; before concluding 
with an analysis of way in which the EU law might be developed in such a way as to 
ensure that a legitimate outcome will emerge. 
 
a) Is it possible to withdraw from the EU without using Article 50? 
Prior to the Treaty of Lisbon, there was academic debate over whether it was even 
possible to withdraw from the European Union or Community, given the commitment to 
‘ever closer union’ in the Treaties, and the ‘unlimited’ duration of the enterprise.14 It 
seems clear that withdrawal must always have been legally possible;15 in the absence of 
                                                          
14 See Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585. 
15 See also Lazowski, n4 above at 525: ‘it is widely accepted that that lack of an exit clause does not 
preclude the possibility of withdrawal from an international organisation’. In relation to the EU, 
withdrawal has been contemplated at various times in various states; in particular in the UK, which held a 
referendum in 1975 on whether the UK should stay in the European Community (Common Market). In 
relation to the ‘idiosyncratic’ situation of Greenland, see F Harhoff, ‘Greenland’s Withdrawal from the 
European Communities’ (1983) 20 CMLRev 13. 
specific EU law provisions, withdrawal would take place under public international law 
rules, in particular the rules established in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties.16 The inclusion of Article 50 in the Treaties in 2009 ‘reflects the intention to 
submit [withdrawal] to the canons of the EU legal order, instead of leaving it to the 
vicissitudes of international law’,17 and to establish a withdrawal process which is able 
to lead to an orderly exit from the EU, in which levels of disruption and uncertainty are 
minimised. In the operation of Article 50, these objectives should be borne in mind. 
Within the domestic debate there has been discussion of whether there are alternatives 
to Article 50. There have been suggestions, in particular among leave campaigners,18 to 
the effect that it would be possible to effectuate withdrawal via repeal of the European 
Communities Act 1972, and thereby reclaiming the ability to legislate domestically free 
from EU law constraints. This would open up the possibility for legal action to be 
brought against the UK, under EU and international law.19 The House of Lords in May 
2016 stated that Article 50 provides the only means of withdrawing from the EU 
consistent with the UK’s obligations under international law: ‘A Member State could not 
fall back on the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to avoid the withdrawal 
procedures in Article 50, because the Vienna Convention had to be read in the light of 
the specific procedures for treaty change laid down in the EU Treaties’.20 As opinion in 
the UK has quickly coalesced around the proposition that withdrawal will be pursued 
via the Article 50 route, the rival arguments are not considered further here. 
  
b) Who makes the decision to trigger Article 50?    
The decision to trigger Article 50 is said to be for the withdrawing state, ‘in accordance 
with its constitutional requirements’. The EU institutions, including the governments of 
the EU27, cannot impose legal pressure on the withdrawing State; though of course they 
may be able to exert some political pressure,21 seeking, for example, to ensure that the 
economic and political uncertainty following the UK’s vote on 23 June is minimised. As a 
matter of UK constitutional law, it is clear that the referendum only has advisory 
status.22 There have been debates within the UK about the extent to which the decision 
to trigger Article 50 is for the Prime Minister, acting under prerogative powers,23 or for 
                                                          
16 See also re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 SC 217, before the Canadian Supreme Court. 
17 Hillion, n4 above at 149. 
18 See eg 
http://www.voteleavetakecontrol.org/a_framework_for_taking_back_control_and_establishing_a_new_uk
_eu_deal_after_23_june 
19 See also Duff, n10 above. 
20 House of Lords European Committee Report, n7 above at [9]. 
21 See eg: https://theconversation.com/article-50-can-the-eu-force-the-pace-of-brexit-61626 and 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/25/eu-emergency-talks-brexit-berlin 
22 See European Union Referendum Act 2015; discussed in Douglas Scott, n9 above. 
23 See http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jul/05/brexit-can-go-ahead-without-parliament-
vote-article-50-government-lawyers-say.  
Parliament;24 and also questions about the extent to which the Scottish Parliament may 
be able to influence, or perhaps even veto, any decision to pull the Article 50 trigger.25 
To the extent that the decision to trigger Article leads inexorably to a process through 
which the UK withdraws from the EU, with a resultant effect on a range of legal rights, 
protected by virtue of EU law and the operation of the European Communities Act 1972, 
it seems as though the approval of Parliament is required.26 And, it is certainly legally 
possible that, notwithstanding the referendum result, Parliament might decide not to 
trigger Article 50.27 
While the EU institutions cannot impose legal pressure on a State to trigger Article 50, 
the process of withdrawal is governed by EU law. A notification for the purposes of 
Article 50, should only be treated as a notification if it is made according to the 
conditions laid down in Article 50. Thus, where a notification is presented to the 
European Council, it should ensure its admissibility. As discussed below, it may be 
possible for questions relating to the validity of any notification to come before the 
courts. However, given that the only substantive condition relating to the notification of 
the intention to withdraw relates to compliance with domestic constitutional 
requirements, it is to be anticipated that, in any case before it, the European Court of 
Justice will tread carefully.28 As far as possible, it should leave questions of national 
constitutional law to be determined within the Member State.  
  
c) Should there be informal negotiations before Article 50 is triggered? 
The Article 50 process, to the extent that it is outlined in the Treaties, only begins once a 
valid notification has reached the European Council. As such, it seems that questions 
relating to whether there may or may not be informal negotiations between the 
withdrawing state and the EU institutions relating to the withdrawal process are to be 
determined in the political rather than the legal realm.29  
                                                          
24 See eg: https://publiclawforeveryone.com/2016/06/24/brexit-legally-and-constitutionally-what-
now/ 
25 See Scottish Parliament European and External Relations Committee, SP Paper 978, 16 March 2016, 
http://www.parliament.scot/S4_EuropeanandExternalRelationsCommittee/Reports/EUS042016R02.pdf
. 
26 See e.g. David Pannick in The Times, http://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/why-giving-notice-of-
withdrawal-from-the-eu-requires-act-of-parliament-dz7s85dmw; and Barber, Hickman and King, n9 
above.  
27 See e.g. AC Grayling, https://www.nchlondon.ac.uk/2016/07/01/professor-c-graylings-letter-650-
mps-urging-parliament-not-support-motion-trigger-article-50-lisbon-treaty-1-july-2016/.  
28 See by analogy the case law relating to Article 4(2) TEU, discussed in A von Bogdandy and S Schill, 
‘Overcoming Absolute Primacy: Respect for National Identity under the Lisbon Treaty’ (2011) 48 CMLRev 
1471. 
29 The ‘EU side’ appears, publically at least, to be refusing to open informal negotiations with the UK until 
the decision to trigger Article 50 is made. See 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/27/europe-leaders-crunch-talks-brexit-fallout. 
 
The legal position is also unclear in relation to when the ‘guidelines provided by the 
European Council’, in the light of which the Union is to negotiate and conclude an 
agreement with the withdrawing state, are to be adopted, or what their scope might be. 
By virtue of paragraph 4, it is said that the withdrawing state shall not participate in the 
discussions in the European Council ‘for the purposes of paragraph 2 and 3’ or ‘in 
decisions concerning it’.  
In this paper, it is argued that these guidelines are likely to assume much importance, in 
particular in relation to the current situation, in which Article 50 may be triggered for 
the first time. It is suggested that it is important that agreement is reached between the 
European Council and the UK, in relation to full details of the withdrawal process, the 
scope of a withdrawal deal, and the mechanisms through which the deal will be 
concluded and ratified; and crucially, that this should occur before the decision to 
trigger Article 50. The legitimacy of withdrawal process will be enhanced to the extent 
that the UK Government is as fully aware as possible of the consequences entailed by 
triggering Article 50, and is able to secure informed constitutional consent for 
embarking on the withdrawal process.30 Thus, it is to be hoped that the European 
Council, in the wake of the referendum result, and before any decision to trigger Article 
50, is working on the preparation of these guidelines, and is consulting with 
representatives of the UK in relation to their content. If the EU institutions are unwilling 
to provide guidelines, the UK government should apply whatever legal and political 
pressure it is able to muster in order to obtain clarification from the EU institutions in 
relation to the conduct of the withdrawal process; making it clear that the levels of 
uncertainty over the process of withdrawal are likely to delay the decision to trigger 
Article 50.  
  
d) Is it possible to rescind an Article 50 notification or otherwise stop the process? 
Perhaps the most fundamental question to which a legal answer is required is whether 
it is possible for the withdrawing State, having notified its intention to withdraw, to 
rescind or revoke the notification, or, in any other way end the withdrawal process. 
Article 50 does not explicitly contemplate this possibility, but neither does it explicitly 
rule it out. There has been very little academic comment on this issue, but given the 
uncertainties surrounding the way in which the UK Government might seek to act 
following the referendum, it is an urgent question. Paragraph 4 indicates only that the 
Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into force of 
the withdrawal agreement, ‘or failing that, two years after the notification… unless the 
European Council, in agreement with the State concerned, unanimously decides to 
extend this period’. That may be read as meaning that once the trigger is pulled, the 
                                                          
30 It is certainly possible to finesse any legal objections to the participation of the UK in the process of 
drawing up the European Council guidelines, notwithstanding the wording of Article 50(4). One can argue 
that the guidelines are a necessary precursor to the commencement of the withdrawal process; and that 
prior to the triggering of the Article 50, the UK remains a full member of the European Council.   
inexorable outcome is either withdrawal from the EU on the basis of the negotiated 
deal, or, in the event that a deal is not agreed within the two year period and there is no 
unanimous agreement to extend it, a default ‘no deal’ position, in which the UK’s 
relationship with the EU is governed by standard WTO rules. However, if it is possible to 
read in the option for the withdrawing Member State to ‘stop the clock’, it may be that 
there is a third possible outcome: a decision, taken within the two-year negotiating 
period, to rescind or revoke the notification and remain within the EU.  
The clearest statements on this point were made in the evidence presented to the House 
of Lords in February 2016. Sir David Edward and Sir Derrick Wyatt QC were clear that it 
is possible to reverse a decision to withdraw at any point before the date on which the 
withdrawal agreement takes effect. In the words of Professor Wyatt:   
“There is nothing in the wording to say that you cannot. It is in accord with the general 
aims of the Treaties that people stay in rather than rush out of the exit door. There is 
also the specific provision in Article 50 to the effect that, if a State withdraws, it has to 
apply to rejoin de novo. That only applies once you have left. If you could not change 
your mind after a year of thinking about it, but before you had withdrawn, you would 
then have to wait another year, withdraw and then apply to join again. That just does 
not make sense. Analysis of the text suggests that you are entitled to change your 
mind.”31 
Other commentators take a different view. Barber, Hickman and King, for example, 
proceed on the basis that the Article 50 process is irreversible; ‘there is no turning back 
once Article 50 has been invoked. If no acceptable withdrawal agreement has been 
reached within two years, the exiting Member State is left without any deal with the EU’. 
They conclude that the UK ‘could not safely assume that it is entitled to withdraw its 
notification on the basis of the terms of Article 50’.32   
The Treaty of Lisbon appears to have been drafted with the assumption that Article 50 
would only be triggered, in accordance with constitutional requirements, once a clear 
consensus had been reached within the withdrawing Member State. Regardless of the 
arguments now raging in the UK about the authority and legitimacy of the referendum, 
the responsibility of Parliament, and the role of the Scottish Parliament and Northern 
Irish Assembly, it seems at the very least possible that the decision by a Member State to 
withdraw from the EU might be politically contested, and subject to significant internal 
scrutiny. After all, it is widely anticipated that the negotiation of any withdrawal 
agreement would take two, or perhaps more years. Within such a time period, political 
constellations are likely to shift appreciably. It is also, and this is a point to which I 
return in the final section, only once negotiations with the EU have begun, that the 
                                                          
31 House of Lords European Committee Report, n7 above at [10]. 
32 Barber, Hickman and King, n10 above. See also European Parliament Briefing, n8 above, which states 
that ‘most commentators’ argue that it is impossible, or at least doubtful from a legal point of view, to 
unilaterally revoke an Article 50 notification. 
nature of the withdrawing State’s future relationship with the EU, and together with 
that, the practical consequences of withdrawal, will begin to emerge. 
All this militates in favour of a reading of Article 50 which makes it possible for the 
Member State to revoke a notification.33 It is, for example, possible to envisage the 
following scenario. A decision to trigger Article 50 provokes turmoil in a Member State. 
A general election follows. A decisive majority is attained by parties advocating 
remaining within the EU. In such circumstances, it seems ludicrous to hold the State to 
the commitment to negotiate a withdrawal agreement from the EU, and then afford it 
the opportunity to apply for readmission under Article 49. It is clearly far simpler to 
allow the withdrawal process to be stopped. 
Given the uncertainty here, and the clear link between ascertaining an answer to this 
question and making the decision to pull the Article 50 trigger, it seems imperative that 
an answer is found either via the European Council guidelines, or, if necessary, in an 
action before the Court of Justice to interpret EU law. 
  
e) What is the scope of a withdrawal agreement? 
The agreement to be concluded with the withdrawing State, is, according to Article 
50(2), to set out ‘the arrangements for withdrawal taking account of the framework for 
its future relationship with the Union’. This appears to envisage a distinction between 
the withdrawal agreement (or ‘divorce settlement’), and any future framework, which 
might be ‘left for a more comprehensive agreement, to be negotiated at a later date’.34  
Legally, it seems as though even the ‘divorce’ may well require more than one 
agreement. According to Lazowski, ‘agreements on withdrawal, falling under the 
category of international Treaties [concluded in accordance with the procedure laid 
down in Article 218(3) TFEU], cannot amend EU primary legislation but can regulate 
non-primary law matters only. This implies that alongside an international treaty 
regulating withdrawal, the remaining Member States will – most likely – have to 
negotiate between themselves a treaty amending the Founding Treaties in order to 
repeal all provisions touching on the departing country’.35  
When one considers the relationship between the divorce agreement and any 
agreement on the envisaged future relationship between the withdrawing State and the 
                                                          
33 See Duff, n10 above: ‘Within that two year period – for instance, following a British general election and 
change of government or, less likely, after a second referendum - it would be perfectly possible for the UK 
to revoke its decision to quit. That Article 50 is silent on the matter of revocation does not mean that a 
change of direction would be illegal under EU law (as long as the CJEU were convinced that the switch 
was constitutional). The EU is well practised in the art of the stopped clock. Given the collateral damage 
done to the remaining EU by Brexit, a notification that London had changed its mind would be met with 
very great, if somewhat exasperated relief.’ 
34 Hillion, n4 above at 140. 
35 Lazowski, n4 above at 529. 
European Union, the picture becomes still murkier. If the aim is to reach agreement 
between the withdrawing State and the EU within the two year time period, the 
withdrawal agreement should be limited in scope. If on the other hand, the objective is 
to set the course for the future relationship, the agreement will of course need to be 
broader. It is certainly necessary for the withdrawal agreement to ‘bridge the gap’ 
between the old EU regime and the new future relationship,36 and to deal with the 
issues surrounding the acquired rights of individuals and companies which might, over 
time, be phased out.   A ‘catalogue of dossiers would have to be developed’;37 with due 
consideration of what can and should be included within the withdrawal agreement, 
and what is to be determined in other treaties.  
In line with the approach adopted throughout this paper, it is argued that these issues 
should be addressed in the guidelines provided by the European Council, and, as far as 
possible, agreed with the withdrawing Member State before the decision to pull the 
Article 50 trigger is made. In the last section, I argue for a broad interpretation of the 
scope of the withdrawal agreement, so that the contours of the future relationship 
between the withdrawing State and the EU are known before the end of the notification 
period.  
 
f) Can the time period be extended? 
Article 50(3) provides that the Treaties shall cease to apply to the withdrawing State 
from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement, or, failing that, two years 
after the notification ‘unless the European Council, in agreement with the State 
concerned, unanimously decides to extend this period’.  
Thus, it is not clear, even at the date on which Article 50 is triggered, when withdrawal 
might occur, or indeed on which terms. One possibility, though this seems unlikely, is 
that the agreement relating to withdrawal is reached swiftly. In this case, the Treaties 
will cease to apply to the withdrawing State from the date on which the withdrawal 
agreement enters into force.  
If it is not possible to reach a swift agreement, and as the two-year time period comes 
towards an end, the prospect of a withdrawal without a negotiated agreement will begin 
to loom large. This would mean exit from the EU without a withdrawal agreement, with 
no option but to fall back on the trading terms derived from membership of the World 
                                                          
36 House of Lords European Committee Report, n7 above at [25]. See also [31]: Coordination between the 
withdrawal treaty on the one hand and the future relations treaty on the other would be important. The 
UK’s aim would be to have a smooth transition between the past in the EU and the future in the new 
arrangement. 
37 Ibid at 529-33. 
Trade Organisation.38 Transitional arrangements would be handled unilaterally by each 
side. The view of Sir David Edward is that ‘the long term ghastliness of the legal 
complications is almost unimaginable.’39 
It is in the best interests of all, in particular of individuals and companies with acquired 
rights in the UK and the remainder of the EU27, for exit without an agreed withdrawal 
deal to be avoided. There are, it seems to me, two ways in which this may be 
accomplished.  
First, Article 50 expressly provides for the two year time period to be extended, but only 
on the basis of the unanimous agreement of all States. That agreement cannot be 
guaranteed; and at this stage it is impossible to speculate about the likely pressures 
within various Member States which may affect the decisions of their governments 
about whether to agree to an extension of the negotiations. Thus, it seems that this is 
possible, but politically very uncertain. In relation to the extension of the time period, 
there is also what I take to be a mischievous suggestion by O’Dell that the negotiated 
period could, with the agreement of all, be extended indefinitely, with the result that 
withdrawal cannot take place.40   
Second, if, as argued in this paper, it is possible to revoke the Article 50 notification, it 
becomes possible for the withdrawing State to make a unilateral decision to avoid the 
prospect of a disorderly exit, and to remain within the EU. The ramifications of this are 
considered more fully in the final section.    
 
g) What is the status of the UK during the negotiation process? 
As discussed above, subject to application of paragraph 4, which deals with 
participation in discussion in the European Council and Council relating to the 
withdrawal process, the withdrawing State remains a Member State of the EU, with 
rights and obligations intact.41  
As regards the rights of the withdrawing State, certain interpretive difficulties may arise 
in any attempt to delineate the situations in which the withdrawing State may, and may 
not, be involved in European Council and Council decision-making. Once again, this is an 
area in relation to which the guidelines provided by the European Council may provide 
clarity. In practice it seems almost inevitable that the role and influence of the 
                                                          
38 Note however that even this option may not be straightforward, and will require agreement within the 
WTO. See http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/745d0ea2-222d-11e6-9d4d-
c11776a5124d.html#axzz4Dd5Y4Uki.  
39 House of Lords European Committee Report, n7 above at [49]. 
40 See http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/article-50-route-to-a-second-referendum/  
41 Nationals of the withdrawing State will, in principle, retain their positions in the EU institutions 
pending the entry into force of the withdrawal agreement. It is interesting in this regard that there seem 
to be no plans to replace Lord Hill, the UK Commissioner who resigned in the wake of the referendum 
result. 
withdrawing State will inevitably diminish. It is unclear whether the State will have an 
interest in influencing the making of decisions at EU level which might well never 
concern it; and arguable that it is not legitimate to afford it such a role. The power of the 
argument against involvement will of course depend on the extent to which it is 
envisaged that the withdrawing State aspires to continue to have a relationship with the 
EU.  
As regards obligations, the UK will continue to be bound by EU law rules until the 
withdrawal agreement enters into force.42 This includes new EU legislation adopted 
after Article 50 is triggered, but before the withdrawal agreement enters into force.43 
While the UK is due to assume the Presidency of the Council in the second half of 2017, 
it is anticipated that alternative arrangements will be made in order to ensure the 
efficient functioning of the Union.44 The principle of sincere cooperation enshrined in 
Article 4(3) TEU would continue to apply, and there are suggestions that it might be 
used in relation to the conduct of the withdrawing State during the process of 
withdrawal.45  
 
h) How is the withdrawal agreement concluded? 
Finally, there are significant uncertainties relating to the conclusion of the withdrawal 
agreement, both by the EU and the withdrawing State.  
Let me begin with the position as regards the EU. The withdrawal agreement itself is 
negotiated as an EU external agreement, as is made clear by the reference to Article 
218(3) in Article 50. Paragraph 2 provides that the agreement is to be concluded ‘on 
behalf of the Union by the Council acting by qualified majority after obtaining the 
consent of the European Parliament’.46 Thus, it is possible for an agreement to be 
reached without the approval of all 27 Member States; and, unlike in the case of 
accession, for the scope of the Union to be altered notwithstanding the lack of the 
unanimous consent of the Member States. Equally, it is possible for an agreement not to 
be concluded notwithstanding the fact that it is approved by the governments of all the 
Member States. No agreement can be concluded if a majority in the European 
Parliament vote against it. It is also possible, as discussed in e) above, that alongside any 
withdrawal agreement, there will be another agreement, or set of agreements, dealing 
with the future relationship between the withdrawing State and the Union. To the 
extent that any such agreements are mixed agreements, they require ratification by all 
                                                          
42 It should noted that there may be complications in relation to the enforcement of EU law against the 
withdrawing Member State; whether before the Court of Justice, under Article 258-260, or before the 
national courts. See further below. 
43 House of Lords European Committee Report, n7 above at [58]. 
44 It seems that Estonia, due to hold the Presidency in the first half of 2018, will assume the Presidency in 
the second half of 2017; see https://euobserver.com/political/134109. 
45 See Hillion, n4 above at 139-40. 
46 On the possibility of a turf war between the EU institutions, see Duff, n4 above. 
Member States, a process which will inevitably slow down the conclusion of the 
negotiation process.47  
On the side of the UK, the withdrawal agreement would require ratification in 
Parliament, in accordance with the UK’s constitutional requirements. This point is 
further developed in the final section. 
 
How might these questions be settled? 
The discussion so far indicates that many of the EU law questions relating to the process 
of withdrawal from the EU are unresolved. Nevertheless, given the uncertainty inherent 
in Article 50, it is contended here that it is possible, perhaps probable, that there will be 
litigation in relation to the process. There is the potential for such litigation to occur at 
both the national and the European level. It is difficult, at this stage, to predict the form 
which such litigation might take, but there are a range of claims which it is possible to 
envisage.  
Claims may come before the European Court of Justice in the following ways. The most 
obvious basis for legal action will be in relation to the content and scope of any 
withdrawal agreement. Such an action might relate both to the procedures through 
which the withdrawal agreement was reached, and the substantive terms of any such 
agreement; and might come before the Court either directly in an Article 263 TFEU 
judicial review action, or indirectly, via a preliminary reference from a national court 
under Article 267 TFEU. It may, in addition, be possible to seek an advisory opinion 
from the Court via Article 218(11) TFEU as to whether the agreement is compatible 
with the Treaties. Actions may also be brought at earlier stages in the process, for 
example in relation to whether the negotiation process is compatible with EU law. As 
has been mentioned above, it is possible to envisage the making of claims against the 
withdrawing State, not only by the Commission under Articles 258 and 260 TFEU, but 
also, potentially, by the European Council and Council under Article 7 TEU.  
There is already discussion of legal action in the UK on the basis of the conduct of the 
referendum campaign, and over the constitutionality of any decision to pull the Article 
50 trigger.48 Such litigation is likely to raise questions relating to the interpretation of 
EU law (most obviously, in relation to the interpretation of Article 50, perhaps based on 
the points discussed above), which the UK courts may decide to refer to the Court of 
Justice. At each stage of the process, legal action is possible – for example in relation to 
the conduct of the negotiations, and of course, in relation to the scope and substantive 
content of the withdrawal agreement(s).  
                                                          
47 See Lazowski, n4 above at 528. 
48 See https://www.theguardian.com/law/2016/jul/03/parliament-must-decide-whether-or-not-to-
leave-the-eu-say-lawyers and http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jul/05/deadline-approaches-
government-response-brexit-legal-challenge-article-50.    
This paper suggests that, in order to avoid the risk of litigation, the rules of the process 
should be clarified via the guidelines to be provided by the European Council. So as to 
be able to fulfil this function, the guidelines must be provided prior to any decision by 
the UK to trigger A50, and should provide as much clarity as possible in relation to the 
key questions discussed above, including in particular in relation to the ability of the UK 
to rescind the notification process, the scope of the withdrawal agreement(s), the status 
of the UK during the withdrawal process, and the mechanisms through which the 
withdrawal agreement(s) may be concluded. It is recommended that the UK 
government be fully involved in the drawing up of these guidelines. It may, of course, be 
that agreement is impossible to attain, or that the European Council refuses to provide 
guidelines before the decision to trigger Article 50. In such circumstances, it may be that 
there is litigation in relation to the Article 50 process, with courts playing a key role in 
shaping the process of withdrawal.    
 
A suggested way forward 
It hardly needs to be said that this is a crisis situation for the European Union. The 
prospect of the withdrawal of the UK from the EU is fraught with economic and political 
risk. Article 50 is intended to provide for the orderly exit of States from the Union. 
Whether or not this goal is achieved will largely depend on the conduct of the 
withdrawing State and the process of negotiation. Nevertheless, the legal framework in 
which the negotiations take place is also significant, as it determines the parameters 
within which the range of political actors involved will frame their strategies. The text of 
Article 50 provides very few answers. Nevertheless it envisages the provision of 
guidelines by the European Council. These may operate as the vehicle through which 
the answers to the legal questions identified in this paper are developed. In order to be 
able to play this role, they should, in the wake of the referendum outcome, be provided 
in advance of any decision by the UK to trigger Article 50. And, to the extent that this is 
possible, they should, notwithstanding the wording of Article 50(4), be agreed in 
negotiation with the UK, in order to minimise the risk of what may prove to be complex 
litigation, across more than one jurisdiction, in relation to the conduct of the withdrawal 
process.  
I have argued above for Article 50 to be interpreted in a way which ensures that the UK 
is best able to maintain a working relationship with the UK, and achieve a settlement in 
which the interests of citizens of the EU are best protected. This suggests that the 
European Council guidelines should provide not only for a withdrawal agreement, but 
also for an agreement which defines the future relationship between the UK and the EU. 
To the extent that this objective is not achievable within two years, the European 
Council should commit to extending the time period. Most importantly, it should be 
made clear it is possible for the UK to rescind its notification, together with any 
procedural steps to be taken in order to stop the process. 
Once there is more clarity, the UK will be able to consider its response. The calls to 
refuse to pull the Article 50 trigger are increasing, with legal efforts within the UK 
directed to imposing pressure on Parliament, either as a result of the conduct of the 
referendum campaign, or a result of the rights affected by the withdrawal process, not 
to trigger Article 50. While this option might be constitutional as a matter of UK law, it 
would carry with it a multitude of social risks, furthering poisoning relationships 
between the political elite and the people, who may feel that the result of the 
referendum has been ignored.49  
It would be far better for Parliament to accede to the will of the people, and trigger 
Article 50; but only once the Article 50 process has been clarified; and it is argued here 
that this should be via European Council guidelines relating to the process of 
negotiation. Parliament has a role in scrutinising these guidelines, and in providing full 
guidance to the government and the people in relation to the substantive content and 
scope of the negotiations, the negotiation timetable, and the steps to be taken in relation 
to the conclusion and ratification of the resulting agreement(s).  
As has been argued above, it should be made clear that it is possible for the UK to 
rescind the Article 50 notification. The European Council should commit to negotiations 
with the UK in relation not only to a narrow withdrawal agreement, but also to a 
broader agreement on the future relationship between the UK and the EU. It is only if 
these two conditions are met – and it may be possible for the UK to exert not only 
political but also legal pressure on the European Council in relation to the content of the 
guidelines – that it is possible to envisage a legitimate outcome to this crisis.  
The clarification of the uncertainty surrounding the Article 50 process will enable the 
UK to make an informed decision in relation to the pulling of the Article 50 trigger. The 
UK government must then work on its negotiating strategy, and seek to reach an 
agreement with the EU27 which deals with withdrawal and the future relationship 
between the UK and the EU. It is only during the process of negotiation that it will 
become clear what leaving the EU will actually entail. There will, presumably, be a range 
of difficult decisions, for example in relation to the UK’s desire to control immigration, 
and to retain access to the single market (and we will all learn a lot about the operation 
of the EEA, and Switzerland’s relationship with the EU); and about the acquired rights of 
EU citizens in the UK, and UK citizens in the EU. In the time period in which negotiations 
will occur, there will no doubt be significant economic and political change within both 
the EU and the UK. Towards the end of the negotiation period, it will be possible for the 
UK to make an informed choice; either a) to rescind its notification and remain within 
the EU, b) to accept the negotiated deal, or c) to exit the EU without a deal. That decision 
will be for the UK, in accordance with its constitutional requirements. Parliament will of 
                                                          
49 See also R Ekins, ‘The Legitimacy of the Brexit Referendum’, UK Constitutional Law Association Blog, 
available at https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2016/06/29/richard-ekins-the-legitimacy-of-the-brexit-
referendum/. 
course be involved, and consideration will no doubt be given to allowing the people to 
have a further say, either via a general election or indeed a second referendum.   
The process of withdrawal is not going to be easy. The EU law framework surrounding 
the operation is very unclear, with the provision of guidelines by the European Council 
representing a key moment in which it is possible to contribute towards the legitimacy 
of that process. This paper offers a number of recommendations. It is to be hoped that it 
prompts careful consideration of the options ahead, so that it is possible to arrive at a 
legitimate outcome, in which the interests of citizens of the EU are, as far as possible 
protected.        
 
